The Sutta Nipãta
Along with the Dhammapada, the Sutta Nipãta is one of the most basic texts in all of Buddhism in that it is usually one of the first to be learned by anyone taking instructions in Buddhism and that it contains the simplest expressions of basic attitudes that are treated more systematically and at greater length elsewhere. The Paramatthakasutta of the Sutta Nipãta comprises the following eight verses.
769. A person who persists in opinions regards as a waste everything other than that, which thinking "it is supreme", he regards as best in the world. Therefore he fails to get beyond disputes.
797. Than grasping at just that which he sees as commendable to him self in rules of conduct and vows and in what is seen, heard or thought, he regards everything else as loss.
798. The experts call that thing a shackle owing to which one considers all else as waste. Therefore the monk should not pursue rules of conduct and vows on what is seen, heard or thought.
799. Nor should he form an opinion of people through knowledge or
thought rules of conduct and vows. Nor should he present himself as an equal, nor should he think of himself as mean or excellent.
800. Giving up assumptions and not taking them up again, he does not pursue even knowledge. Indeed he does not side with any party in controversies, nor does he believe any opinion whatsoever.
801. He who has no inclination for either extreme for being born or not being born either in this world or in another has no attachment whatsoever that is grasped after discriminating among properties.
802. Here not even the slightest judgement is formed by him with respect to what has been seen, heard or thought. How could anyone in this world doubt that unassuming Brahman.
803. They do not form judgements, they do not show reverence; not even virtues are accepted by them. Brahmans are not to be guided by rules of conduct and vows. Having gone elsewhere, such a one does not return.
The Sentiment that runs trough these verses and many others like them in the Sutta Nipãta is clearly that opinions lead to strife and disharmony among people. People become attached to their own opinions and their own doctrines and come to disdain people who hold other opinions and doctrines. People from hierarchies of doctrinal acceptability, ranking some doctrines and the people who hold them above other doctrines and the people who hold them.
It might be noted in passing that this principle of ranking doctrines is evident in many of the philosophical primers that where produced in later times in India. For example the structure of such works as the fourteenth century Sarvadarśanaḿgraha of Vidyarãņya alias Mãdhava is to present first those opinions that the author regards as least valuable and to end with those opinions that the author regards as the least valuable and to end with those that he he regards as closest to the truth. Mãdhava, incidentally, places Buddhism to the beginning of his work, considering it only slightly better than Cãrvaka materialism. The practise of ranking doctrinal systems hierarchically also became common in later Buddhist authors who in their introductions to philosophy often distinguished between some systems of Buddhist thought that were said to be aimed at people of lesser intelligence and other systems that were said to be more sophisticated. A typical feature of all treatments of philosophy that proceed this way is that in their of opinions of "lesser value" than their own, they present caricatures rather than accurate portraits of the rival philosophical systems. A number of modern scholars, relying on such compendium for their information on philosophical systems that where not favoured by the authors of the compendium, have been led into presenting rather badly distorted accounts of the conclusions and the arguments of philosophers who where far more subtle than their opponents where willing to acknowledge. Such distorted accounts, and the kind of unsavory consequences that the Sutta Nipãta says comes to the pursuit of diţţhi or opinion.
The attitude towards the value of opinion expressed by the author or authors of the Aţţhakavagga (section of Octads) of the Sutta Nipãta is that opinions are shackles that impede one's attainment of peace of mind. The true sage, the Buddha on the other hand, has forsaken all opinions and given up all disputes and in so doing has attained inner peace.
837. The Lord said "Magandiya, there is nothing that he accepts, saying 'I assert this!' after discriminating against properties. And looking among the opinions without assuming any, seeking inner peace I found it.
A little further in the same discourse, the Buddha says:
847. "One who is free of judgements has no shackles. One who is set free by wisdom has no delusions. But those who take up judgements and opinion go about in the world being contentious.
In this expression of the Buddha's attitudes towards opinions, there are some matters that need to be explained. The attitude is not necessarily that of a sceptic, who doubts weather it is possible to attain certainty about a range of questions. Rather it is the expression of an observation that the pursuit of truths leads to social disharmony. People who claim to know the truth tend to be obnoxious in their penchant for pointing out the stupidity in those who hold alternative opinions.
What is still needs to be explained is whether this attitude that is attributed to the Buddha is supposed to extend to all opinions or only to a specific range of opinions. Buddhist tradition has not been univocal in its answer to this question. In some interpreters there is a tendency to class as opinion (diţţhi, dŗşţi) only a certain prescribed set of opinions that are at odds with accepted Buddhist dogmas. On this interpretation, when the Buddha says it is salubrious to abandon all opinions, he means to abandon all false opinions (micchã diţţhi). Stock examples of false opinions that already occur in the Nikãya literature are: that events happen adventurously, or trough devine intervention, or as a result of purely material causes independently of consciousness or will, as opposed to the accepted Buddhist view that they are the result of karma; that a person exists as an ultimate reality, as opposed to the accepted Buddhist view that persons are mere constructs of mind; and that an existing person either ceases to exist upon the death of the physical body or continues to exist in some other form after death. But there also exists a more radical interpretation according to which when the Buddha prescribes the abandoning of opinions of all opinions on any issue whatsoever that do not have a direct bearing on the attainment personal happiness and inner calm. Advocates of this latter interpretation can find support for their opinions in such Nikãya passages as the Brahmajãlasutta of the Dïgha Nikãya and Mahãvagga 65 of the Aṅguttara Nikãya, tikinipãta.
Taken from:
Dignaga on the interpretation of signs
by
Richard P Hayes
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